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Abstract Though not dominant, the prominence of Christianity in the forming of
Conservative party policy has increased since the 1990s – the touchstone organisation for
this rise is the Conservative Christian Fellowship. Using interviews with mid- and elite-
level actors, and policy documents, this article traces the activity of small ‘c’ Christianity
in the Conservative party under the leaderships of William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and
Michael Howard, in the forming of the Centre for Social Justice and, in Cameron’s early
leadership around social justice policy. It is argued that Christianity became a minor but
important inﬂuence within a party undergoing a period of uncertainty after the election
defeat of 1997. Key to this analysis is the understanding that parties cannot be easily
changed by leaders alone; rather change in policy emerges, in part, from mid-level actors
before ﬁltering up to the leadership.
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Introduction
Christianity has always played a role in the Conservative party; indeed, there is a
long-established saying that the Church of England is the Tory party at prayer.
But, as this article attempts to demonstrate, it is only in the last 15 years that a
Christian religious belief has become a more explicit inﬂuence in the making of
party policy. Christianity’s role in British politics is not domineering; rather it is
nuanced and intermixed with secular beliefs. Therefore, to emphasise this aspect,
this article refers to christianity in the lower case. This can be labelled small ‘c’
Christianity, to temper the notion that the role of Christianity in Conservative
party’s policy making has become overbearing. The argument presented here is
that the prominence of christianity has increased as a result of Christians within
the party becoming more organised during the post-1997 era. On the basis of
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interviews with actors at various strategically important levels of the Party, and
analysis of documents produced since the 1990s, this article maps the emergence
of this new grouping and its inﬂuence on the generation of policy. It begins by
looking at the origins of the Conservative Christian Fellowship (CCF), and its
transition from a group with a low level of interest in inﬂuencing party policy to
one with key contacts in the William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith (IDS)
leaderships. The article goes on to examine the forming of the Centre for Social
Justice (CSJ), the christian elements of its interests, and its interaction with the
Cameron leadership. The progression of this christian grouping highlights how
party policy change over time can be inﬂuenced by mid-level actors. The material
presented here shows that policy is not always changed all of sudden by the
leadership, but often ﬁlters up from below, especially from groups who have been
looking elsewhere, in this case towards the Christian church, for new ideas.
Christianity and the Party in the 1980s and 1990s
Christianity has always played a part in Conservative identity, both for many of its
individual members and for the party as a whole. Recent work on Margaret Thatcher
(Filby, 2015), highlights a prime minister deeply grounded in issues of faith that
directed her work. Filby writes (2015, p. 7): ‘… in 1979, unbeknownst to most of the
public at the time, Britain had elected its most religious prime minister since William
Gladstone’. Filby provides a detailed account of Thatcher’s religious motivation,
rhetorical borrowings and spiritual sustenance. But the operative word from Filby is,
of course, ‘unbeknownst’. Christianity here is a source of inner reﬂection. One sees
similar inner Christian belief in many political ﬁgures; however, what remains
common to most is that these were personal faiths, that drove a personal sense of
politics. For example, Major (2010, p. 195) writes in his autobiography: ‘I was
mortally embarrassed to be interviewed about my religious faith … My religion is a
private matter. I do not ﬂaunt it … I found the questions too personal to answer
without seeming sanctimonious, and turned my answers to substantive issues’. These
personal faiths did not lead to the creation of Christian policy networks in the party at
the mid and low levels of the party structure. We do not see think tanks, or desks at
Conservative Central Ofﬁce, or policy reports, or public consultations, occurring
with a speciﬁc Christian focus. Indeed, as Filby writes (2015, pp. 3–15) what one
sees in the 1970s and 1980s more broadly in all political parties and the country as a
whole is increasing secularisation of speech and attitudes.
In the mid 1990s, however, there was a general change in attitude towards the role
of faith in public life. As Farnell (2009, p. 184) writes:
The policy discourse surrounding community involvement has a long history.
However, it was only in the 1990s that this ‘community’ focus extended to the
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participation of people identifying by their religion … [The attitude is] that
faith groups have resources and should be networked appropriately.
Farnell identiﬁes moves by central government, particularly advocated by New
Labour after 1997, to reach out to faith-based groups of all religions. Christianity
had shifted by this point from being a general British cultural habit to a narrower
identity. A speciﬁc political grouping had emerged that perviously would have
been indistinguishable from the general population. As we will see, this new
grouping consisted of individuals wanting to inﬂuence policy along christian lines.
The idea that one’s politics should grow out of one’s faith-gained traction; and once
a critical amount of individuals began to adopt this view, networks began to form.
So it is no surprise that Conservatives should have felt the ripples of this broader
change; at ﬁrst informally and then formally, utilising the established organisa-
tional roots of the party.
The Emergence of the CCF
The touchstone organisation for the rise of christianity in the Party is the CCF,
formed in December 1990 (CCF, 2000) by two students at Exeter University,
Tim Montgomerie (who went on to be IDS’s chief-of-staff) and David Burrowes
(who became chairman of the CCF, an MP, and PPS to Francis Maude, Oliver
Letwin and Owen Paterson). A former CCF Chairman, Gary Streeter MP
(Interview, 2011) suggests that the emergence of the CCF was something quite
new at the time:
It was a combination of people wishing to express their Christian faith in a
political arena … in a way that hadn’t been done for 200 years, working it out
as we were going; and 20 years ago people were saying: how could you
possibly be a Christian and involved in politics, it doesn’t quite ﬁt. Now there
is a much better understanding of faith and the public sphere.
Crucially, the CCF did not begin as a political organisation operating within the Party
to further a policy agenda. For most of the 1990s, as it gained relative popularity
within the parliamentary party and the party at large, it went largely unnoticed by the
leadership; seen as a somewhat inert extra-parliamentary concern. According to
Hordern (Interview, 2011), a former director of Renewing One Nation and a current
Trustee of the CCF:
The CCF up to then [1997] had really existed for the encouragement of
Christians within the party; it was more to do really with meeting together to
pray, to share the faith. It was less focused on policy and ideas, and more
focused on encouraging fellowship between Christians.
The role of small ‘c’ Christianity in the Conservative Party
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By the late 1990s, however, with the Party newly in opposition, the CCF, under the
inﬂuential leadership of Tim Montgomerie, began to become more active in the arena
of policy debate.
By the end of the 1990s, there began emerging within the CCF a sense of a
particularly christian approach to policy that was increasingly at odds with the
status quo. Examination of the pamphlet output of the CCF, or their quarterly
magazine Conservatism, reveals a growing interest in speciﬁc policy recommen-
dations in both editorials and articles, and an increased attempt to inﬂuence the
terms of debate during this moment of institutional uncertainty following the
landslide defeat of 1997 (see for example, Burkinshaw, 1999, 2000). According to
Streeter (Interview, 2011) ‘Partly it was about wanting to bring an edge of
compassion into the Conservative Party … The 80s were very much about
pounds, shillings and pence: it was possibly a little harsh’. In the ﬁrst interim
report of the CCF’s (1998) Listening to Britain’s Churches consultation (p. 3), the
recommendation is made that ‘special help should be given to churches and other
community-based initiatives that are either preventing or healing the effects of
family tension’. The emphasis here is put on the need to restore local peculiarity
and loyalty to local institutions (CCF, 1998, p. 13); and ‘how local, voluntary
compassion … can be strengthened and developed’ (CCF, 1998, p. 21), in
particular when working with lower income groups. In a further report from the
exercise, the CCF (2000, p. 4) list:
The ten principles of compassionate communities: 1. The existing social
safety-net must be protected. 2. We must rise to the challenge of helping
those that welfare is failing … 10. Public policy must protect beneﬁciaries’
rights to a choice of welfare models but soft alternatives should be avoided in
order to protect the independent sector’s efforts to rebuild sustainable
behaviour.
These principles, and the report as a whole, would not have looked out of place in the
Party’s 2010 manifesto: but at the time they presented a new area of policy emphasis
that began to be mooted around mid-level policymakers.
However, it is important here to also note that ‘modernising’ changes in policy
emphasis, moving towards a more beneﬁcent form of Conservatism, were not the
whole story of the CCF at the time. Notably, in regard to Labour’s plan to give age-
of-consent parity to gay and straight sex, an anonymous editorial in theWilberforce
Review (1998, p. 9), the Fellowship’s in-house monthly magazine launched in
1992, calmly notes that ‘it is worth remembering … American research suggests
that paedophilia is three times more common amongst homosexuals [and] in the
year to June 1997, 871 men died of AIDS in the UK because of homosexual
intercourse’. One of the publicity successes of Cameron’s leadership of the party
has been that this type of homophobic tone has almost wholly disappeared from
Conservative public discourse.
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The CCF Under Hague
The project known as Listening to Britain’s Churches, ‘took [the CFF] in a new
direction’ (Hordern, Interview 2011). This was the initiative that the CCF linked to
William Hague’s and Peter Lilley’s more highly publicised Listening to Britain
policy research exercise launched to renew policy after 1997. Over the coming years,
Listening to Britain’s Churches would prove to be inﬂuential on party policy.
Franklin (Interview, 2011), a CCF member and part of the 2004 Howard Policy Unit,
remarked that ‘in the event that [Listening to Britain’s Churches] turned out to be a
rather better, rather more substantial piece of work than the main consultation’.
Bale (2010, p. 83) writes of the Listening to Britain research exercise that:
‘[Pollster] ICM’s private research likewise suggested that … [it] had “made
absolutely no impact whatsoever” and was rapidly running out of steam’. This
observation is certainly true of its immediate impact; however, its long-term impact
was more signiﬁcant, though largely hidden from general sight.
This early exercise, now somewhat faded in the memory of the Party, meant that
mid- and low-level christian operators gained experience of organising, forming
policy ideas from outside the Party hierarchy – or in some cases partially outside –
and crucially it showed that small ‘c’ Christianity could be an organising factor,
ideologically but also materially; that is to say, numerous social connections were
made. The exercise looked at over a 100 charities (Hordern, 2011), people were
introduced to others who were of a like mind on a more socially orientated
Conservatism and networks began to emerge; networks that would have been
unlikely to have emerged if directly administered by the leadership. As Hordern
(2011) remarks, ‘many of the people we went to see [for Listening to Britain’s
Churches], I knew them, because I had built up that knowledge over many years’.
Thus, although a number of CCF members already possessed a font of previously
untapped social capital, the exercise helped to release such agency – despite
operating at lower levels of the institution – to generate policy and research that was
new to the leadership of William Hague.
Under Hague, the CCF were, geographically at least, at the centre of Party power –
Montgomerie and Hordern had a desk at the Conservative Central Ofﬁce in Smith
Square (Hordern, 2011), as directors of the Renewing One Nation team, launched in
October 2000, which grew out of the Listening exercises and continued to advocate
many of the same ideas (see Renewing One Nation, 2000, 2001). Notably, the team
was initially funded by Lord Kalms outside of the Party’s usual funding channels,
and so they had a degree of autonomy from the need to produce immediate media-
ready sound bites and policy lines, and were able to begin to think more broadly
(Franklin, 2011). They had some inﬂuence under Hague, especially around family
policy; a number of policy ideas appeared in the 2001 manifesto that were in keeping
with CCF priorities around families, such as upwards of a £1000 married couple’s tax
allowance and increasing tax credits for those with a child under 5 years of age (see
The role of small ‘c’ Christianity in the Conservative Party
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Conservative Party, 2001). Ultimately their research and proposals, especially around
localism, volunteering and charities, did not become a central part of policy
emphasis, and did not feature prominently in the 2001 manifesto. Hillman (2011),
Special Advisor to Willetts MP, revealed in an interview:
a big row about what the 2001 manifesto should look like. There was a big
William Hague speech [in 1999]: Come with me and I’ll give you back your
country; so there was a discussion about how much it should be based on that
line of argument … Certainly, Tim Montgomerie had done a lot of good work
by 2001 but it hadn’t seeped upwards … There was a conﬂict with the sort of
views taken by the old more Thatcherite think-tanks, the Centre for Policy
Studies, the IEA, the Adam Smith Institute, who were still quite inﬂuential,
more inﬂuential than they are now; during the William Hague period they were
still listened to.
But the importance here is not the immediate inﬂuence of Montgomerie and others on
the Party leadership; it is their long-term inﬂuence on both the party leadership and
the party membership – by this point they had gained a foothold within the party
organisation and this is by far the most important factor in achieving long-term
change. However, because they did not impact the Party at an elite media level, but
rather initiated long-term mid-level processes, their importance has been downplayed
(see for example, Bale, 2010; Dorey, 2011, who argue that little modernising of
social justice policy began under Hague).
The CCF and the Leaderhip of IDS
After the 2001 election these CCF mid-level players remained when other more
senior backroom ﬁgures exited (though Nick Wood, notably, stayed as press ofﬁcer
under IDS). The Renewing One Nation team kept their desk at CCO and were ready
to advise the new leader IDS. It survived the change in leadership and provided
continuity. At the mid-level of a party, the clock is rarely reset when a new leadership
arrives. In many ways, and somewhat unintended at the time, one of Hague’s
signiﬁcant contributions to change in the Party was the approval of the setting up of
this small research group, a policy offshoot, in all but name, of the CCF. As Franklin
(Interview, 2011) remarked: ‘It [Renewing One Nation] is quite a foundational body,
it was an incubator for lots of what would later come out of the CSJ [Centre for Social
Justice]’. And it was the CSJ that would prove to be the most enduring achievement
of this low-key movement that started in the late 1990s.
But ﬁrst IDS had to take a famous journey to the Easterhouse estate in Glasgow, in
January 2002. As a consequence of this visit, ‘Helping the Vulnerable’ became the
title of the Party spring forum in March. As Smith (2003), a devout Catholic, said in
his speech at the forum in Harrogate: ‘Our agenda is so vital for people in vulnerable
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communities like Easterhouse, Glasgow. I will never forget my visits to them’. The
authenticity of IDS’s Easterhouse conversion has remained moot – Bale (2010, p. 154)
writes that ‘some in the Party found it hard … to believe that Duncan Smith’s
damascene discovery of poverty … was anything but opportunistic’. However, we do
not need to understand the event in primarily instrumental terms; and we should not
label it as a spontaneous action by the leader, which was then imposed on the Party.
Rather, it should be read as the next in a serious of mid-level movements that had
begun back with the CCF in the late 1990s. Read as such, it becomes more credible that
the ever-building focus on issues of ‘compassionate Conservatism’ and social justice,
which have been traced as beginning in the 1990s, should continue in this way.
IDS may have been moved by the poverty of Easterhouse; and simultaneously, he
may have been tactically aware of electoral exigencies. Indeed, the constant
negotiation between beliefs and tactics in the language of the leadership means that it
is often difﬁcult to unpick one from the other. Consequently, leaders are not always the
clearest indicators of what an institution believes, if examined in isolation. Especially,
when we consider that IDS was also preoccupied with more traditional right-wing
policy around immigration and law and order. What is of greater interest than IDS’s
individual journey is that the means by which he expressed his new sympathy towards
social justice, whereas still utilising policy and language that adhered to Tory
sensibilities, did not appear suddenly in a great light. Rather, they appeared after a
number of years of incremental change, which became emergent at the leadership level
(if, ultimately, only temporarily) at this moment. We see that what enacts a change in
policy is not only the leadership but, moreover, the lower levels of the party ﬁltering up
new ideas that make sense of the electoral environment for the leadership – and IDS at
Easterhouse is a prime example of this ﬁltering process.
There is Such a Thing as Society…
In retrospect, the most signiﬁcant policy text of this period – though in many ways it
reads as much as a broad mission statement – was a collection of essays under the
title There is such a thing as society – edited by Streeter (2002). It is, indeed,
remarkable how many subsequently high proﬁle ideas, and well-known phrases
initially appear or at least collocate for the ﬁrst time, in this text. It contains essays by
prominent members of CCF, who articulate their social justice focus on policy
alongside the traditional neo-liberal priorities. Streeter (2002, p. 5) writes that:
‘Everyone knows that the party is for the aspirational, the high-ﬂiers, and the
entrepreneurs. That must remain true whilst shifting our focus, our resources
and our language behind those less fortunate. Everyone matters’. Hordern (2002,
pp. 151–152) writes of how; ‘the solution [to promoting responsible fatherhood] lies
in looking away from Whitehall and towards local communities. The last ten years
have seen a ﬂowering of family support services provided at a local level by a wide
The role of small ‘c’ Christianity in the Conservative Party
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range of statutory and voluntary organisations’. And Franklin and Malluk Bately
(2002, p. 225) write, in a notable presaging of the language of the later ‘Big Society’,
that ‘public funding per se is not the problem’, but that government must create
‘funding mechanisms that empower donors, volunteers, providers and recipients’.
But this book is also notable for marking the early coming together of CCF
originated thinking with other individuals who were not of the same grouping. As
Franklin (Interview, 2011) remarked: ‘A lot of the people involved in this were
religiously inspired, though by no means all. Oliver Letwin is a self-described atheist;
David Willetts an agonistic: but yes there is that Christian democratic element, that
whole sort of Wilberforce legacy’. The christian element is crucial; but it also, ultimately,
had to be transcended if the ideas being promulgated were to appeal widely in the Party
and beyond, and not just be seen as the interests of a single group. Consequently, also
included in There is such a thing as society is an essay by Letwin (2002, pp. 48–49)
who, in a somewhat theoretical piece, links compassionate Conservatism and social
justice policy to the core neo-liberal ideology of reducing the state and decentralisation:
‘Interventions by the state often undermine multidimensional relationships’, he writes.
‘Only the renewal of community institutions offers vulnerable people a sustainable
possibility of escaping from cycles of deprivation’. And Willetts (2002, p. 55), who is
somewhat less severe on state reduction, continues to develop his ideas of civic
Conservatism and public private co-operation, writing that: ‘we have a responsibility to
our fellow citizens and it includes a responsibility that can only be discharged through
effective public policy as well as through personal and private action’ (emphasis added).
Finally, the book is given the imprimatur of the current leader at the time, IDS.
CCF Ideas are Presented to the Party
Soon after the publication of There is such a thing as society, IDS gave the CCF’s
2002 annual keynote speech, known as ‘the Wilberforce Address’. In his speech, IDS
continued with the new policy emphasis of helping the vulnerable, while tying his
agenda to more established Tory and Christian concerns around the preservation of
the family unit. ‘The most fundamental institution’, said Duncan Smith (2010, p. 81),
‘of any free and sustainable society is the family’. At the 2002 conference,
International Development Shadow Caroline Spelman, a committed Christian and
closely loyal to IDS, introduced the theme of ‘There is such a thing as society …’ to
the Party at large, a signiﬁcant minority of whom, says Hordern (2011), through the
previous 5 year’s work by the CCF and its offshoots, were familiar with her tone and
receptive to it; but many others had yet to be convinced (see Bale, 2010, p. 164). One
of the failures here was that the dominant message from the conference came from
Theresa May’s now famous ‘Nasty party’ speech, which was somewhat well-
received by the public but met with a degree of resistance from the Party grassroots
at a conference that was riven with disagreement on policy emphasis (see for an
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account, White and Perkins, 2002). Interestingly, though the ‘nasty’ epithet is
attributed to May, its use can be traced back to Cooper (2001, p. 18), who writes of
the need to avoid policy, such as opposing the repeal of section 28, that perpetuated
‘the common caricature of Conservatives as nasty and intolerant’. Cooper, former
Head of Strategy at CCO under Hague, later became Cameron’s Director of Political
Strategy. The etymology of the ‘nasty’ label is only of small consequence: but it is
indicative of how events attributed by the media and some academics to elite level
actors can be traced to activity at a lower level.
IDS and Social Justice Policy
So, as can be seen, it was not the case (as has become the dominant narrative) that
IDS was emancipated from the leadership, and embarked upon his interest in social
justice policy largely after his removal, when he was out of the limelight. Dorey
(2011, p. 177) typiﬁes this conventional view when he writes:
The other key progenitor of a new mode of Conservatism prior to Cameron’s
election as Party Leader was Iain Duncan Smith, who, once he was freed from
the constraints and responsibilities of being party leader, devoted himself to
addressing poverty and social disadvantage.
This assessment underplays the importance of mid- and low-level christian actors,
who were the real drivers of change around social justice policy in this period, in
favour of work that is overly focused on IDS’s failures. But his leadership was not
characterised by a failure to champion new ideas; to view it that way is to wrongly
imply that these ‘modernising’ ideas suddenly emerged with Cameron, which is
empirically not the case. Once we recognise this, we are better able to identify the
role of christian mid-level policymakers in this period. As Hillman (Interview, 2011)
remarked:
People have this view of IDS that he was a terrible leader but now he’s
rehabilitated himself. But he did one very important thing as leader: he
basically said that nothing we announce or do should ignore vulnerable people,
and pretty much the edict of every press release, every speech was meant to
talk about how our policies were meant to help vulnerable people.
Hayton and Heppell (2010, p. 8), who give IDS a fairer and more accurate
assessment, evidence that one of the key examples of IDS’s failure was his inability
to join the competing modernising groups of the CCF and the metropolitans (based
around the think tank Policy Exchange) that would form a key part of Cameronism:
The Hague era… had witnessed the gradual embedding of a divide over social,
sexual and morality-based politics. How this should be managed was an issue
The role of small ‘c’ Christianity in the Conservative Party
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when Duncan Smith faced a parliamentary division on the adoption of children
by unmarried and same-sex couples in November 2002 … Duncan Smith
imposed a three-line whip and demanded the PCP endorse a strongly socially
conservative position.
Eight MPs deﬁed the whip, including Clarke and Portillo, and 35 abstained, whereas
John Bercow resigned from the front bench. Bercow at the time was closely allied with
the small progressive policy group ‘C-change’ – and produced, with Hillman (Interview,
2011), the group’s only pamphlet, which was ultimately pulped before it was ever
distributed. In a similar vein, in March 2003, IDS, along with seventy other Tory MPs,
voted for an amendment that opposed the repeal of Section 28. Thirty Tory MPs voted
against the amendment (and by implication for the repeal). Cameron sagaciously
abstained. O’Hara (2007, p. 317) writes that it was IDS’s ‘support of this amendment
that was taken as marking the Tories’ decisive, and ultimately disastrous move back to
the right’. IDS’s actions indicated to the wider party that he could not be trusted on
certain ‘modernising’ objectives which were important to them; and, in consequence
they manoeuvred against him. As Deane (Interview, 2011), who was Chief of Staff
2004–May 2005 to Tim Collins MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Education, remarked:
When IDS fell, I was a research fellow at Policy Exchange, so I was in and out
of the Party a lot… it needed something to happen, and no-one likes to put the
knife in, but it had to be done, a plane chunk of that was being operated out of
Policy Exchange, actually.
And it was, after all, Francis Maude (one of the founders of Policy Exchange) who
wrote to Michael Spicer, chairman of the 1922 Committee, asking for a conﬁdence
vote on IDS’s leadership. However, the primary take-away from the IDS period is
that his downfall was because of a lack of managerial competence and charisma, not
of ‘modernising’ ideas or a failure to attempt change. Overall, it should be a matter of
note that in the area of modernising ideas on social justice policy, as Franklin
(Interview, 2011) conveyed: ‘strangely enough (because IDS’s departure was
precipitated by the modernisers) the Howard leadership was a good deal less
modernising than the IDS leadership’. This is important to note because it means
that we can emphasise the importance of the CCF under IDS. It can be shown that
new policy was being put forward. The very fact that he experienced trouble from the
metropolitan modernisers was indication that he was having to manage the
competing interests of two inﬂuential tendencies.
The Founding of the CSJ
IDS had gradually begun to rely on CCF founder Montgomerie more and more
during his short leadership; in the summer of 2003 he appointed him as his political
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secretary and Chief of Staff. According to Franklin (Interview, 2011), ‘the idea was
that the CCF ideas would become incorporated increasingly into what the party was
doing anyway, but by the time Tim was really sort of beginning to sort out some of
the problems with the leadership, it was sadly too late’. Because the CCF / Renewing
One Nation initiative had become so close to IDS by 2003, it was unceremoniously
rejected alongside him. As Deane (Interview, 2011) remarked: ‘The Conservative
Party has a certain level of institutional personnel, which goes relatively unchanged,
but lots of individuals who are in key areas, Tim Montgomerie being a classic
example, they went, and I think that is probably healthy’. But when we understand
ideational change as happening through institutions and actors, and operating on
many levels, we are also sensitive to the fact that people and ideas do not necessarily
vanish when actors lose elite power; if, that is, they have ideational momentum and
networks within the institution, especially networks which are ideationally connected
to, but not materially consumed by, the institution. And this is what happened, quite
unsurprisingly, to compassionate Conservatism when IDS lost power. Indeed,
Franklin (Interview, 2011) talks of the ‘direct refoundation of Renewing One Nation
in the CSJ’.
The CSJ was created in 2004. Though IDS was a necessary public face of CSJ, and
quickly became deeply involved, the initial nuts and bolts of setting up the think tank
were largely done by Montgomerie and its ﬁrst director Philippa Stroud, who was a
prominent member of the Conservative and Christian community in Birmingham
(Hordern, 2011). The CSJ allowed small ‘c’ Christianity and compassionate
Conservatism to develop a rich range of social justice policies without the need to
negotiate the tandem interests of other party modernisers, which had been the weak
heal of IDS’s leadership.
The ﬁrst major decision Cameron made as leader was to launch a policy review
into six policy areas: national and international security; public service reform; social
justice; quality of life; overseas aid, globalisation and global poverty and economic
competitiveness. Most of these reviews were exercises that had little impact.
However, the social justice policy review, given to Duncan Smith and the CSJ, was
more impactful. By the launch of this policy review in 2005, the CCF and then the
CSJ had managed to create a foundational network of contacts with actors in the third
sector, as Franklin (2011) recalls: ‘through Renewing One Nation we found a lot of
people to come up and support [the review]’. This network of contacts was way
beyond what the Party proper had achieved; and the CSJ was able to further build
upon the network during the review to produce a report and policy proposals, and
eventual roll-out strategies, more advanced than any of the other review reports – all
of which had little lasting impact. The CSJ, however, was put in charge of a policy
review precisely because of a perceived lack of inﬂuence. As Boles (2011) remarks:
‘Obviously CSJ do their stuff and they do it very well, but they were so directly set up
by IDS, and IDS himself was outside at that point, so that he could do one
[a review]’. Indeed, there was no intention by the leadership that the CSJ should
The role of small ‘c’ Christianity in the Conservative Party
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produce a high impact report. Its later impact was not orchestrated by the party
leadership, as far as the leadership was concerned the signiﬁcance of the report was
an unintended consequence.
The social justice policy review involved more researchers, more interviews, and
more sub-reports than any of the other reviews. It was a moment that was tactically
seized on by the CSJ – led by the energy of IDS – and was to prove a key moment in
the increase of their inﬂuence. The already established strong links of the CSJ to the
third sector were exempliﬁed by the appointment as deputy chair of Stedman-Scott
(2011), who ﬁrst met IDS on his visit to the Easterhouse estate, where the
unemployment charity she heads has an operation. They remained in contact – and
she was on hand to be asked to join the review a few years later. ‘This was an
absolute in-depth look’, Steadman-Scott (Interview, 2011) later conﬁrmed of the
review; moreover, ‘Never once did someone say “this is the answer we want” ’. The
CSJ appointed a secretariat to oversee the Social Justice Policy Review, and also
divided the project into separate working groups. Each conducted their own research
and wrote their own reports, which were collected, for the diagnosis report, under the
title Breakdown Britain (Callan, 2006; Clark, 2006; Fraser, 2006; Fforestfach, 2006;
Gyngell, 2006; Stancliffe, 2006) and for the policy report Breakthrough Britain
(Callan, 2007; Fforestfach, 2007; Fraser, 2007; Gyngell, 2007; Robson, 2007;
[Steadman-] Scott and Brien, 2007). The CSJ based their research around what they
labelled as ﬁve key ‘paths to poverty’: addictions; family breakdown; worklessness
and economic dependence; educational failure; and indebtedness.
The strong emphasis from the Breakthrough Britain report was that more use
should be made of third sector organisations to carry out work at present done by
local authorities – in areas of children’s services and child protection, job seeking, drug
abuse and homelessness. Organisations such as Tomorrow’s People, for example,
whom Baroness Scott also represented, were understood to be more effective at
returning people to work, and more importantly, keeping them in work. The move to
the third sector was not necessarily framed as a way to cut spending. Organisations
such as Tomorrow’s People receive the majority of their income from government
contracts, rather than foundational trust money or donations (Stedman-Scott, 2011). To
think of the entire project as merely a money saving device, therefore, is to miss the
different strands that came together in the CSJ report, and went on to be included under
the umbrella term ‘Big Society’. Early thinking in the area does not prioritise reducing
spending – neither is the method expected to do so, charity organisations do not work
for free when they take on local authority contracts. There is a through line of the
Christian idea of community altruism and good works done by the individual at a
personal level. ‘The Christian roots’, suggests Fraser (2007, p. 68) ‘of most social
action and reform in Britain are well known… [F]aith groups still undertake a vast and
disproportionate amount of poverty-ﬁghting’.
There is here a strong push for an increase in donations to charities, and
volunteering; however, the most impactful proposals are around the privatising of
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government contracts in areas of social justice, disability provision, unemployment
initiatives, counselling, drug rehabilitation, housing support and so forth, to the third
sector. So what we have is not the advocating of a reduction in state spending per se,
but a privatising of certain public provisions to the (paid) third sector based on the
ideological principle that the state is too unwieldy to deliver such services.
Interestingly, though, we see with the CSJ less of an emphasis of the systemic
inefﬁciencies of the state and more an emphasis on the inherent ethical virtues of the
third sector, in part with regard to – though by no means exclusively – faith-based
groups. As Kettell (2012, p. 283) writes, in one of the few analyses of the religious
inﬂuence on Conservative social policy: ‘the idea of promoting an expanded role for
religious groups in the provision of welfare and social services lies at the very heart
of the Big Society plan’.
An Underpinning of Christian Ethics
Even where it is not explicitly stated in the CSJ social justice report, there is reported
evidence of a (most often implicit) Christian ethos shaping the work of the CSJ
during the policy review. Gyngell (Interview, 2011) remarked that:
there was quite a strong faith based part to it … quite a lot of people Philippa
[Stroud] put me in touch with were from faith based groups, which were
absolutely admirable … Most of the people there, that would have been a
common denominator certainly, a shared belief in Christian ethics, other
people were more actively Christian, David Burrowes [CCF founder, Deputy
Chair of the Addictions Working Group], Samantha Callan [CSJ senior
researcher] …
Following to some degree from this, there is an emphasis on improving quality of life
and community cohesion through the family, and government policy to encourage
nuclear families – something less seen with other modernisers in the party. As Callan
(2007, p. 106) writes in the report: ‘We do however argue against current ﬁscal
policies which disadvantage couples because, ﬁnancial considerations aside, lone
parents rarely choose that status, enjoy raising children on their own, or want their
own children to become lone parents themselves’. And by eliding correlation and
causality, Callan concludes that: ‘Children raised by two parents tend to do better
across a whole range of variables as our earlier volume made clear, so it seems
somewhat perverse for policy not to do all it can to support rather than penalise this
family model’. The CSJ report holds off on proposing a married couples tax credit
(this they did more conﬁdently later, see CSJ, 2010); but they do suggest spending on
counselling retreats, writes Callan (2007, p. 55), by ‘stimulating the market for such
care and opening up opportunities for the third sector and private providers to meet
demand’.
The role of small ‘c’ Christianity in the Conservative Party
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There was a sense of those involved in the CSJ that they had, in a manner, nothing
to lose. As Gyngell (2011) comments: ‘IDS was the least popular person on the
planet, no one thought on IDS’s back they were going to get preferment’. As a
consequence of IDS’s tarnished reputation, there was a disconnection from the usual
channels of authority. What replaced these channels, and established policy debates,
was a momentum that had been growing for nearly a decade and had begun with
CCF. And it was because the party, at the mid-level, had already set up, over a
considerable period of time, and through the varied interest (and occasional lack of
interest) of previous leaders, a group of people genuinely committed (within their
own particular ethical rationalisation and contiguous ideology) to this area of policy
that the CCF grouping strongly emerged at this point to take the baton. This was not
leader led, a moment created out of thin air by Cameron, it came from the mid-level
of the party, which fed up a policy emphasis to the top.
The review was the point at which the CSJ began to make an impact at the
leadership level. Since then, its ideas have merged somewhat with other modernisers.
Yet the CSJ are at times still seen as a group apart, marked somewhat by small ‘c’
Christianity, and the concomitant policy positions that are implied. Indeed, the
modernising strands of the party have not perfectly harmonised to this day, and there
are still differences between them. As Hillman (Interview, 2011) remarked:
I think that one of the things avoided by going into coalition, was a bit of a
battle between the CSJ type Tories and the Policy Exchange type Tories on
something like tax breaks for married couples. So though both Policy
Exchange and CSJ were both important in giving us a human face again, there
were tensions, there wasn’t a single movement towards change.
However, with IDS’s entry into government as Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions the CSJ can rightly claim that they remain an important source of ideas at
the elite level. But by tracing, as has been done here, the origins of these ideas before
they emerged at the elite level, it has been possible to show the role, often
downplayed, of mid-level actors of engendering such change within the party.
This change culminated in the 2010 manifesto, with its complimentary main
sections of ‘Change the Economy’ and ‘Change Society’. In the ﬁrst section it is
stated (Conservative Party, 2010, p. 5) that the priority is to ‘eliminate the bulk of the
structural deﬁcit over a Parliament’, alongside, inter alia, improving international tax
competitiveness and increasing the private sector’s share of the economy. In the
second section, it is stated (Conservative Party, 2010, p. 37): ‘Our public service
reform programme will enable social enterprise, charities and voluntary groups to
play a leading role in delivering public services and tackling deep rooted social
problems’. The manifesto goes on to outline how policy will enable: parents to start
new schools; an expansion of Academy schools; a Big Society bank to fund local
projects; a Big Society Day to celebrate the third sector; to employ measures of
well-being rather than just of income; a National Citizen Service, beginning with
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16-year-olds, to encourage volunteering; supporting families with tax credits for
married couples and civil-partnerships earning up to £50 000; ﬂexible paternity and
maternity leave; free nursery care from a diverse number of providers and a
commitment to not cut spending in the NHS. The seed of these ideas can be traced
back to the CSJ policy review, which in turn can be traced back to the CCF and the
inﬂuence of christianity in the 1990s. What Cameron has done is successfully merge
this tendency to competing neo-liberal interests around the state and the economy.
Cameron was the ﬁrst post-1997 Tory leader to command a relatively united party
while in opposition. As Hancock (Interview, 2011), who entered parliament for the
ﬁrst time in the 2010 Tory victory, conveyed:
In David Cameron you have someone who brings all of these strands together
[CCF and Policy Exchange], which hark back to an older Conservatism that
understands all of these different inﬂuences and brings them to the table rather
than trying to create some overall high philosophy … Cameron is a practical
politician: he’s not an ideologue.
The inﬂuence of think tanks and mid-level actors lessens once a party is in
government. Their period of greatest inﬂuence is during the years of opposition
when new ideas are in highest demand and there is no access to a civil service.
Inevitably, we see, therefore, that the CCF’s most notable direct impact was in this
period. However, (mainly through IDS at Work and Pensions) the ideas of the CCF
tendency maintain inﬂuence in government, in areas of welfare reform, universal
credit, the shifting of local services towards third sector providers, and the increased
use of faith-based charities, precisely because it is not overly dominant. Rather, it is
mixed with other tendencies (which are generally compatible) by a leader who is
largely satisﬁed with such pluralism.
Conclusion: The Overall Role of the CCF
We might ask then, why could the CCF bring new ideas into the party during the
opposition period? It is the case that what kept Conservative small ‘c’ Christianity
alive through Thatcher and Major – a sort of self-claimed Wilberforcean conserva-
tism – was the external body of the church. With its symbols of fellowship and
altruism, the Christian church operated outside of the party and was able to hibernate
ideas on social justice. When the CCF acted to bring new ideas into the Party, they
came in under a neutral guise and were interpreted as the reactivation of a traditional
Conservative religious position.
In times of uncertainty, actors may turn to a source of values that offers guidance
to a way forward. As Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 251) note, social institutions,
such as the Christian church, are adhered to because ‘they provide individuals with
vocabularies of motives and with a sense of self’. This ethical vocabulary was held by
The role of small ‘c’ Christianity in the Conservative Party
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the church, then entered the party and became increasingly prevalent. What is the
case is that for an increasing grouping in the Party, ethical, Christian-based, language
and a concomitant understanding of the world began to inform policy after the
uncertainty of the 1997 election defeat. However, we should not assume that
Christianity offers a constant type of idea that is non-changing. The Christianity
prevalent in the contemporary party is contemporary itself – it is highly motivated,
politically engaged, and mixes a sense of community engagement with sexual
politics. Therefore, the focus of this piece has not been towards how the Tory Party is
informed by Christian ideas per se, but rather how Christian ideas have been made to
work for the contemporary party. And, indeed, how these ideas can be used by non-
Christian actors. We do not see a reversion to pre-neo-liberal Christian ethics, but a
use of Christian ethics in a particular way which develops upon, but is also
harmonious with, neo-liberalism.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the CCF inﬂuence on the party was not
merely about ideas. For the material element is crucial for these ideas to succeed. In
the case study presented here, we see the drawn out process of ﬁltering new ideas
through the organisation of the party, in the forming of contacts and networks, of
think tanks and policy documents, and meetings with the leadership. Whereas
Christian ethics may have provided some of the language, many of the ideas, and
much of the personal drive, it was the Tory Party and its established organisation that
gave the CCF grouping the means of political inﬂuence. As Franklin (Interview,
2011) reﬂects on the whole rise of small ‘c’ Christianity in the Party:
Well, it was always there, certainly in some people, but it never had the, well, it
was there, but there as a personal, until all of this started, there was never a
modern political framework to express it; the key point of all of this, is that it
has provided a framework, which engages with the larger framework of politics
and policy making, that didn’t exist before, the intellectual framework, the
policy framework, and the sort of social capital, the contacts with both like-
minded people in the party but also outside of the party, like front line
practitioners, if you were to say what changed: it’s that – it went from
individual, to collective – before it was trapped within people and not out there,
it didn’t have a ‘political’ existence before, and now it does.
We see that disparate ideas, moving from the bottom up, can make a signiﬁcant
impact on areas of party social justice policy because the party already has
mechanisms in place to gather those ideas. It is instructive, therefore, to address
the relative lack of attention that has been given to the Christian impact on change
in the party since the early 2000s, and its role in shaping Cameronism. It is, of
course, only one grouping within a wider set of interests, all of whom are jostling
for position. Giving it due attention, however, sensitises us against over-
privileging leaders as the primary source of change in political parties. With
Cameron, he has, in the area of social justice, looked to enact policy ideas
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developed over a long period of time by others. Cameron has then sought to
negotiate the desires of competing sections of the party. The Christian inﬂuence is
by no means dominant, but it is now established in the party as an active
grouping, particularly around social justice policy.
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